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Rational planning for individual needs and 




Practical rationality, when collective choices are at stake, should certainly rely on principles. These 
principles are perhaps not without effect on our representation of the problems to be addressed in 
collective action. We investigate how this structuring role of pragmatic principles accounts for 
notable context-dependent features of governance procedures. In the field of social policies, for 
example, the enhancement of personal autonomy has come to the forefront of collective challenges. 
Capacity-based approaches indicate a way to put into question those conceptions of autonomy 
which lead to an excessively uniform treatment of individuals. Following these approaches, the 
beneficiaries of social policies should be treated as concrete beings with their personal history, living 
in specific social contexts and so on.  We analyse the individualizing logic which is exemplified in 
interactive problem-structuring and institutional decision-making about the provision of apt, context-
sensitive care and services for ageing handicapped persons.  It is suggested that the sought-for 
adaptation to specific circumstances is made possible through a complex process of description of 
problems and challenges for collective action, in which procedural aspects are important. This 
process is by no means reducible to a passive process of adjustment to independent states of affairs. 
If our analysis is correct, there is no such thing as the “real” nature of individual situations, as 
opposed to the fictions associated with ordinary social policies: the process under scrutiny really 
redefines the nature of institutional interactions, responsibilities and the underlying picture of the 
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  Practical rationality is, among other things, a matter of pragmatic principles which have a 
guiding role for individuals and groups. The benchmark principles are usually quite general 
and the rationality of collective choices has to do, presumably, with the ability to turn the 
principles into reality with relevance, in an efficient way. How should we conceptualize this 
ability in the first place?  
  Pragmatic principles for collective choices could be identified, it seems, with the selection of 
desirable states of the world, chosen among the possible ones. Then we would be induced to 
look at the administrative or political implementation mechanisms as if they were more or less 
neutral instruments, by means of which we see to it that the world exhibits the desired 
patterns.  But the following statements, if true, complicate the matter:   
  First of all, pragmatic principles undergo interpretative changes. This, of course, may impact 
representations of the collective implementation process, when it comes to spelling out the 
details of action problems with a view to the effectivity of principles2. Turning goals into 
reality depends on one’s views about the meaning of those principles which help articulate the 
goals. It can be argued, in this respect, that pragmatic principles have distinctive properties 
when it comes to interpretation needs: for example, they have an unequal potential for being 
made precise in a useful way, or in an objective way3.  
  In addition, pragmatic principles have a role to play in problem-structuring activities (and 
hence in decision-facilitation tasks at the prescriptive level), if only because they channel and 
format the information which is used in decision-making (this was emphasized in A. Sen’s 
pioneering contribution to the information analysis of moral principles – see Sen [1979]). The 
chosen benchmark principles determine a selective awareness to specific features of the social 
context and personal situations; this enables them to play a crucial role in the development of 
joint work and inter-organizational (or inter-institutional) collaborative relationships4.  
   Among these properties, it is perhaps fair to say that only the correlation of principles with 
their respective information needs has been the object of systematic inquiry up to now. In this 
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joint research, we take a broader view. The noted characteristics are investigated with 
reference to the autonomy, dependence and capacity (or capability) concepts. The institutional 
use of these notions in social policies gives support, we believe, to our initial statements. Such 
notions, in their concrete use, are related to a constructive social process; this process, we’ll 
argue, illustrates the characteristics we have just mentioned.  
  We’ll highlight the notions of « dependence » and “autonomy” and their role in spelling out 
principles of collective action, with respect to the challenges of old age and the aging. We’ll 
investigate the type of context dependence and some of the procedural features or governance  
which can be associated with dependence-based or autonomy-based principles for collective 
action. More particularly, we ask whether context dependence and the procedural features are 
impacted by those dominant interpretations of “dependence” and “autonomy” which rely on 
the “capability” notion (and the related principles for collective action)5. With this goal in 
mind, we’ll examine the involvement of personal autonomy and individual capacities in 
governance processes. A case study will be provided by an institutional interactive process for 
answering the needs of the aging population of handicapped persons in France.   
  
2. Capabilities, contexts and the enhancement of autonomy  
2.1 General intent of the « capability » approach to personal autonomy  
  The contemporary capacity or capability approach, as developed by A.K. Sen (and, along a 
different path, by Martha Nussbaum) has concentrated on the description, assessment or 
measurement of personal capacities for choice which contribute to the objective well-being of 
individuals. This approach is now widely recognized as a model which can be used to 
articulate collective goals which pertain to the enhancement of personal autonomy, or the 
mitigation of personal dependence. For this reason, it is advisable to look at a number of 
structural features of this approach, in order to elucidate how autonomy-based or dependence-
based principles have a structuring potential in collective action tasks.  
  A. Sen has defined his “capability” set on the basis of “functionings”, which are various 
features of doing and being for individuals. Capabilities (a special construal of the general 
notion of personal capacity) are envisioned, from the start, as opportunities for various types 
of achievement in life. Individual choices are the matter, but the perspective goes beyond the 
sheer availability of a number of alternatives and the selection operated among them. Sen’s 
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approach is remarkable on several accounts. It endorses a “freedom viewpoint” which brings 
together the choice faculties and the value an agent may locate in the different ways he can 
use these faculties.  
  In this perspective, it is allowed that various value judgments, including consequentialist 
evaluations, are constitutive of the worthiness, in the eyes of individuals, of those faculties 
which are involved in their freedom of choice, hence in their freedom generally speaking. In 
addition (and correlatively), this approach brings into close contact, in the joint assessment of 
freedom and well-being, the “procedural” dimension of choice (the features of action - that is 
to say, of the process leading to results) and the “opportunity” dimension (the nature and 
value of choices in themselves). In such a perspective, it is hardly possible to overlook the 
social dimension of personal capacities: individual and social determinants of personal 
capacities are thus intimately associated. This accounts for the context-dependent features of 
the associated policy-making agendas.  
  It is recognized from the start (and how could we possibly deny it?) that the possible 
achievements of human agents are dependent upon the context, more specifically, the social 
environment in which their actions or initiatives take place. For instance, the ability or lack of 
ability of a handicapped person to engage in a university course may depend on the collective 
effort to see to it that handicapped persons who use a wheelchair are proper access to the 
amphitheatres and seminar rooms. This, in itself, gives a reason to look at a specific kind of 
information, namely, those features of the social world which explain the consequences of 
personal characteristics. It appears necessary, when it comes to assessing personal capacities, 
to bring some properties of the social environment into the picture. One may think of 
collective initiatives, public policies and their achievements. Indeed, the explicit 
amalgamation of pieces of information about personal characteristics and about the fitness of 
the environment can be considered a strong point of capacity-based approaches to social 
ethics.    
  There are limits to explicitness: being a descriptive framework or matrix, Sen’s capability 
approach should not be expected to be ideally precise in its formulation6. It stands in need of 
interpretation but, compared with other principles of social ethics, the principles it puts 
forward strike one as relatively imprecise. This is not without consequence from a pragmatic 
point of view. Since the concrete use of capability-related principles is heavily context-
dependent, it creates a need for a complex process of adjustment to the prevailing social 
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context. Making these principles adequately precise in specific contexts is no easy task and 
this might impact the ways of collective action. Operationalizing the capability approach for 
the purposes of socio-economic field studies and the detailed analysis of collective options 
stands out as a major challenge for researchers. It should be noted, however, that generality 
and vagueness have merits of their own and create room for successive influential 
interpretations7.  
   The capability approach can be used as a normative benchmark when it comes to assessing 
social policies as instruments for the enhancement of choice capacities or margins for action. 
To be sure, these values are not entirely consensual, as many people believe that restrictions 
on individual margins of action are valuable in themselves, especially as testimonies to the 
limits of individualism, or the individual endorsement of a social or traditional discipline. 
Nevertheless, the enhancement of personal capacities for choice is essential to all varieties of 
progressive thought. The approach is indisputably individualistic in character, as it 
concentrates on the situation of individuals with a view to evaluating (positively or 
negatively) the evolution of society, or those policies which have an impact on it. This brand 
of individualism, however, is attenuated by Sen’s distinctive resolution to take full account of 
the complex interaction between the situation of persons, their social life and their 
environment.  
  This kind of approach can be used to assess the extent to which handicaps and capacity 
impairments are being compensated in an active way. For example, the handicapped persons 
may expect a better working life and everyday care both from improved medical services 
(which impact their personal situation) and from collective initiatives with an influence on 
their environment (for example, through the adaptation of workplaces or the setup of health-
care and home-service procedures)8. Because of this association of personal, environmental 
and social parameters, the quest for the relevant information in problem-structuring tasks 
benefits from being oriented toward the interaction of the person and the social, technical and 
material environment. In this respect, with practical purposes in mind, the capability approach 
can help.  
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2.2 The interactive side  
  Up to now, we have treated the social dimension as a set of parameters in the environment of 
personal initiatives. The interactive dimension has only been tacit. But should we not inquire 
into it in a more detailed way? One important interactive feature is related to the claims which 
are put forward in the aim of promoting the choice capacities (or the achievement 
opportunities) of persons in specific groups, or persons in specific situations. These 
“claiming” initiatives must be considered in association with the reactions they meet: the fact 
that they are heard (or not), understood (or not) and, possibly, successful. In the case of 
handicapped persons and those who must face “dependence” situations, this is often captured 
through the notion of “empowerment” for specific groups of persons with shared interests to 
uphold. There is a growing normative interest attracted by the empowerment of social and 
institutional actors in their mutual relationships.  
  This notable interactive dimension is involved in the claiming initiatives which aim at the 
development of choice capacities, or various lifetime achievements to be made eligible for 
specific groups in the population (or for people in specific situations). Such claiming 
initiatives should be viewed as correlated with the reception they meet, as theories of 
relational and collaborative governance have emphasized9: how they are heard, understood 
and, finally, followed by real effects in social life. The specificities of public choice (such as 
public-interest standards in deliberative activities) and public-image concerns may induce 
officials to develop their receptivity to the needs of handicapped or dependent persons. 
Insofar as reputational concerns are involved, the same applies to firms, in addition to 
immediate profit-making motives. Of course, this receptivity can be lowered by budget limits 
or by priority conflicts which involve other concerns.  
  One step beyond, we must encompass the fact that individuals adapt themselves to their 
environment. They develop useful skills and aptitudes in an environment which has been 
shaped by nature and by their fellow men and women. The resulting capacities have their role 
in shaping the statu quo situation which provides a benchmark for evaluating collective 
initiatives: the usefulness of such initiatives is correlated, of course, with a judgment on the 
antecedent state of things. Thus, there is an interactive side to the determination of personal 
capacities. Personal capacities depend on individual adaptation to policies, and expectations 
about future policies. Policies, in turn, are launched in a way which may depend upon the 
situation of persons in the relevant population. But adaptation to impoverished conditions is 
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no sufficient ground for a positive judgment on the state of society. Social criticism is useful 
in this respect, as a supplement to existing claims in society, especially when social demands 
reflect  a more or less fatalistic acceptation of poor living conditions.  
  A paradoxical situation is possible with respect to public policy, as a consequence of 
individual expectations. Among other things, individual choices are influenced by 
expectations of future action (or the lack of it) at a collective level. For example, people with 
motricity problems may be tempted to limit their mobility through adjustments in their 
lifestyle and personal goals, because they don’t expect favourable policy initiatives in the 
predictable future. After this pattern, individuals may improve their personal situation on their 
own initiative, in such a way that, all things considered, public authorities are distracted from 
acting in the required way in the interest of handicapped or “dependent” individuals. From a 
normative point of view, impoverished prospects in life are a predictable and problematic  
outcome. The other way round, collective decisions may be reached on the basis of 
expectations about the selective adaptive efforts of handicapped or ageing individuals (and 
their circle of relatives, friends or employees). For example, limited care for the dependent 
elderly could be the consequence, in some cases, of optimistic estimates of the ability of these 
persons to rely on their own efforts for the enhancement of their living conditions.  
 
3. A Case study 
 
  Dealing with the dependence situations associated with ageing is a collective and complex 
decision-making process. It involves successive administrative and political reports, plans and 
policies as well as detailed institutional steps. This process comprises the identification of 
emerging problems, the buildup of frameworks for analysis and description, the deliverance 
of prescriptive advice and collective action in the end. All this takes place against a 
background of deep uncertainty with respect to the future of the ageing population, in terms of 
size, qualitative needs and lifestyle. The selection of collective ways of dealing with 
imperfectly specified problems turns out to be connected, we hypothesize, with the limits of 
information and prediction, when novel situations keep emerging10.   
  We now concentrate on the example of a CNSA 2010 report (the result of “practice 
exchange” workshops, nov. 13th, 2009 to feb. 4th, 2010, National Fund for Solidarity and 
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Autonomy, France), entitled Aide à l'adaptation et à la planification de l'offre médico-sociale 
en faveur des personnes handicapées vieillissantes [Aid to adaptation and planning for 
medical / social supply in favour of ageing handicapped persons]. This example gives an 
opportunity to (1) examine (with a view to autonomy problems) the way “capacity” principles 
are mobilized, transformed into decision procedures and used in a context-dependent way, (2) 
examine how the capacity approach can be associated with (or favours?) individualizing 
strategies in the answer to collective problems, (3) examine the role of inter-institutional 
dialogue in interactive decision-making11.   
  The report concentrates on three essential dimensions of interactive planning in the 
examined policy domain: (a) the elements of debate (what is at stake, really?); (b) the 
emerging consensual benchmarks; (c) examples and successful experiments. This last feature 
can be hold to be illustrative of a well-known stylized fact (established in comparative work 
by Robert Matland12): when policies have ambiguous goals or means, success or interesting 
results are typically dependent on successful experiments and initiatives. In the case at hand, 
the complexities of ageing as a process and the multi-dimensionality of “handicap” broadly 
conceived, certainly contribute to the ambiguity of goals and means. In addition, it is 
commonplace to observe that the notions of “autonomy” and “dependence” have complex 
meanings. 
  The CNSA report is the result of « practice exchange » workshops, aiming at the 
identification of the concerned population and its needs (in terms of accompanying actions or 
care). A major challenge was to characterize, on this basis, the necessary adaptations in 
collective answers, and the possible collective choices. Answering the needs is, by and large, 
identified with promoting autonomy: the whole point of the enterprise is to look for efficient 
ways to deal with the conditions of an autonomous personal lifestyle. The specific effects of 
ageing (at the individual level) are characterized in terms of autonomy losses. This has to do 
with the following factors: the negative evolution of functional capacities (which are already 
negatively affected by handicaps), the growing susceptibility to illnesses which are 
statistically associated with old age and, finally, the changing expectations associated with a 
new step in lifetime (which negatively impact the value of significant possible choices).         
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   The technical report must provide guidance for decision-making. Indeed, it is conceived as 
some sort of problem-structuring and decision-facilitating device. There is a doctrinal side to 
the enterprise but the goals are practical ones and doctrine has a role in practical reasoning.  
The report promotes a specific step-by-step adaptation path. In addition, the report deals with 
the structuring of institutional dialogue. It delivers guidelines for appropriate queries and 
answers to assist the concerned persons in their ageing process. In the interactive dimension 
of institutional decision-making, the analysis of needs fulfils some of its most important 
functions: the enhancement of dialogue through the selection of appropriate common 
benchmarks (or focal points for attention) and the structuring of choices through priority-
setting tasks.   
  The methodological concern for flexible adaptation turns out to be associated with the 
promotion of more substantial guidelines, concerning the appropriate collective choices for 
the country. Thus, it is suggested that collective organization should be compatible with a 
renewed attention to specific situations. It should be based, ultimately, on the revealed needs 
of individual persons – so the argument goes. 
  Providing for the needs of the elderly raises information problems. As Plato observed in The 
Statesman, policy-making for the city at large makes it impossible to adapt to the details of 
every individual situation. Collective goals and choices necessarily make use of the existing 
(and rough) categories which are otherwise used for descriptive purposes. For this reason, the 
project of placing individual situations at the heart of collective policy-making has difficulties 
of its own. None the less, if we follow the path of an individualistic approach, as the report 
recommends, the ways of collective action should rule out the more rigid sort of “answers” or 
“solutions” which are based on rough estimates of needs; as it turns out, they are always at 
risk of being too standardized and they are hardly able to adapt through time in order to 
accommodate the changing realities of individual lifestyles and environmental data.  
  Thus, we find methodological concerns at the root of the collective action process: the 
prevailing statistical categories are inappropriate for accurate descriptions and predictions of 
people’s needs; if we start from such rough data, we are unable to give to pragmatic plans the 
desired flexibility in response to evolving contexts. This actually leads to prescriptive 
guidelines for the collective articulation of what a personal “life project” is about; the process 
exhibits a social buildup of the individual’s “life project” for political (or institutional) 
purposes.  
 10 
  The chosen perspective on individual “life projects” highlights specific individual capacities. 
First and foremost, one’s capacity to develop expectations about the future and to give shape 
to one’s own future in accordance with personal wishes. This expresses personal autonomy of 
course, after the pattern of A. Sen’s notion of “capability”. Thus understood, autonomy 
concerns shed a new light on which capacities matter for the development of the whole 
“capability” of individuals. The subjective dimension of projects and needs comes to the 
forefront. As a result, this side of things is held to be the very foundation of needs-oriented 
dialogue with the relevant institutions.  
  The « life project » notion is thus somehow operationalized in a decision-facilitation 
perspective, with special emphasis on the buildup of institutional dialogue. It can be said to be 
embedded in a socially constructed dialogue situation between individual beneficiaries and 
institutional agents. Incidentally, this makes a difference with the philosophical notions of 
“life plan” (Joshua Royce) and “rational life plan” (John Rawls)13. Thus, the promotion of 
interactive decision-making and the concentration on a given picture of the individual (a more 
or less “liberal”, autonomy-based picture) go hand in hand. The liberal perspective on persons 
and their choices gives weight to a number of directly relevant individual capacities, which 
are at the core of one’s aptitude to express needs and to articulate expectations and claims.   
Let us note that the key notion of a personal and evolving “life project” offsets potentially 
rival notions, such as the continuity of an established lifestyle, or the good fit (or “harmony”) 
between a person’s lifestyle and the social environment. This can be hold to express definite, 
predominantly liberal values.   
  As a matter of operational planning at the collective level, “life project” appears to be 
essentially correlated with the notion of an “individualized compensation plan”. This notion 
refers to an inclusive and coordinated intervention strategy which aims at dealing with all 
handicap situations, irrespective of the possible association with the ageing process or with 
old age as such. The whole enterprise is to let collective action and institutional cooperation 
revolve around personal needs; the ultimate aim is to help individuals fulfil their expectations 
with due assistance in order to compensate for capacity losses.   
  Although they are socially constructed, and designed as matrices for institutional exchange 
and decision-making, “life project” and “individualized compensation plan” are 
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individualistic notions. Thus, the CNSA report exemplifies an individualizing approach to the 
assessment of situations and the elaboration of rational collective strategies. Probably, this is 
favoured by the insistent reference to personal capacities, such as the capacities to choose, to 
engage in activities, to elaborate and revise personal plans, etc. Claude Gamel (2007) has 
argued that capacity-based approaches of social needs tend to be associated with (or indeed, 
actively promote) an individualizing treatment of needs in social policies. The basic general 
idea is that institutional dialogue and interactive decision-making should aim at adapted 
answers to singular situations.  
  For all its problems of applicability, this trend in public policy is attractive to some degree. 
Indeed, it seems rational on the face of it, given the difficulty to predict the real needs of 
persons, as well as the appropriate ways of need-fulfilment, on the basis of general date about 
the ageing process, and age itself. This would seem to justify a tentative adaptation to fine-
grained contextual conditions and personal needs. This is why the collective answers to 
capacity losses should be “modulated”: we must pay due attention to the “complexity” and 
“diversity” of the ageing process in a case-based perspective.  
  The authors of the CNSA report stress that personal history (for example, whether one has 
lived or not in caring institutions) conditions personal needs for the ageing handicapped 
person. But it is not absolutely obvious that, starting from this departure point, we should 
conclude that taking real needs into account presupposes individualized answers and care, 
because the latter are associated with specific problems such as the difficulty and cost of 
truthful information gathering.  
  We have tried to characterize the “individualizing” logic which underpins the “life project” / 
individualized compensation plan” pair of notions. This logic, we believe, tends to favour 
institutional dialogue on the one hand (so that needs can be identified in a detailed way) and, 
on the other hand, interactive decision-making (in order to promote well-articulated, well-
coordinated and efficient answers to existing needs, in the interest of personal capacities and 
autonomy). Such recommendations, if they are to be taken seriously in practice, involve a 
complex, continuous process of reallocation for institutional domains of action (or 
prerogatives). Thus, from the point of view of the involved institutional actors, attempts at 
 12 
rational planning are shown to lead, in this case, to a potential reshuffling of professional 
identifying characteristics14.  
  It seems to us that the institutional dimension of interactive decision-making is well 
illustrated, in this case study, by the quest after a correct equilibrium between the social 
supply of general basic services and the provision of specialized, adapted care. It is expected, 
in this respect, that this kind of pragmatic breakdown of general and special issues could 
eventually coincide with a demarcation line between the needs which can be predicted from 
rough data and the needs which call for dialogue and the familiarization with concrete 
situations.   
  A further interesting feature of the recommendations is the invitation to look for reasons 
when it comes to relying on this or that decision-maker.  Choices of this kind are best 
understood as answers to contextual elements, such as the comparative relevance of the 
acquired know-how of various institutional agents, when it comes to facing new situations. 
Here again, context-dependence is placed in favourable light. It is not portrayed as a source of 
instability or shifty expectations. Rather, it is positively associated with flexible decision-
making. 
   Correlatively, it is suggested that the challenges of ageing call for new skills and new 
collaborative initiatives. This tends to confirm that the action domains of institutional actors 
should be flexible enough, so that they can adapt to evolving contexts of collective action. As 
it turns out, here again, methodological concerns impact substantial conclusions. The need for 
shared reasons in collective action is part of a methodology of collective-action planning. 
Among the relevant reasons, we find the reasons to invest some institutional agents (rather 
than others) with the responsibility to act in given classes of situations. Accordingly, consent 
to the flexibility of institutional responsibilities and prerogatives is advocated.  
4. Conclusion 
   Our main conclusion is that context-dependence is, to some extent, shaped by the chosen 
principles themselves. Focal principles in collective action are not just means to adapt to 
changing circumstances or contexts (in a passive way). The chosen principles actively favour 
definite ways of adapting to circumstances, as exemplified by the development of 
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“individualizing” social strategies to address social needs. These strategies involve a high 
degree of reliance on general principles, both methodological and substantial.  
  In our case study, we haven’t examined the process of developing benchmark concepts and 
principles for collective action in its temporal development ; rather, we have considered 
things as they are, even though we should remember at each step that the involved notions, 
political (and ethical)  principles and evaluative judgments are, by and large, the result of 
constructive, often  interactive social processes.  As a matter of fact, the social use of general  
notions and the elaboration of the companion prescriptive judgments are dependent upon 
inter-institutional relationships, and it might be conjectured with some confidence that the 
latter are influenced by transitory circumstances or emerging contexts. This influence, 
however, does not necessarily rule out objectivity in evaluation or in the reasons which 
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